Determinism, Egotism and Morals. by Heintz, John
DETERMINISM, EGOTISM AND MORALS
BY JOHN HEINTZ
THERE is probably nothing so destructive of human egotism
as the idea of determinism. Even the theory of evohition,
with its long line of brutish ancestors, leaves a way of escape open
for the salvaging of this universal and often useful attribute. But
the one hundred per cent determinist gets little satisfaction in the
way of self-applause due to noteworthy performance.
The old saying of virtue being its own reward fits admirably
into his system of philosophy but even here the glow of satisfaction
which the free will advocate may experience is denied him, or at
least is largely mitigated, by the belief that his virtuous acts are
simply so much ethical phenomena in which he plays the part of
a link in an endless chain of cause and efifect.
One is tempted to ask, therefore, what use can there be in such
a theory of conduct if the result of possessing it is the dampening
of such a stimulating motive as egotism? One answer which has
been given is that for a sound moral theory good conduct must de-
pend upon character, which is equivalent to saying that if a man
cannot, merely by the exercise of free will, go against the dictates
of his conscience we have something which constitutes a real and
permanent basis for a moral theory. However, while this may be
a step in the direction of determinism it does not disprove the
idea of free will except in an absolute sense ; it does put brakes on
it, conditions it, but it does not dispose of the claim of the free will
advocates that a moral theory to be real must allow for a certain
amount of free choice in the individual, that we possess such a free-
dom of choice, and that a moral act consists in the right exercise
of it more so than in the good efifect of the action itself.
It will immediately be seen that the notion that over and above all
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influencing circumstances, both objective and subjective, we pos-
sess an element of dissociation which leaves us free to choose a
course of conduct and which assigns egotism to an important po-
sition in the system of free will, and that determinism, in denying
this element of dissociation automatically removes egotism from
its philosophy. In other words, in free will, credit for good con-
duct is earned ; in determinism, it is unearned. Getting back to
our question then if conditioned free will is not discredited by a
moral theory which bases good conduct upon character and if it
retains by its ideas of dissociation a subtle element of egotism
which makes it appear desirable what claims can determinism ad-
vance for possessing a sounder theory of morals?
Probably the best claim that determinism can advance is that it
can be shown that it is logically related to the kind of a universe
which science has revealed to us. Free will naturally associates it-
self with the deductive, or intuitive, theory of morals. It coincides
with its assumption that we have within us a perceptive faculty
which enables us to sense right from wrong and that this intuitive
gift is originally innate in the constitution of our nature. Out of
this innate moral insight conscience springs and here again we come
across the notion of dissociation which we found to be essential
to free will. Now such an assumption of innate conscience, so
suggestive of divine origin, naturally presupposes a reason for its
being which can be no other than that it was implanted in us as a
guide to conduct and this in turn consistently, if not necessarily,
suggests a free choice in the matter.
Determinism, on the other hand, while it is not absolutely incon-
sistent with the idea of innate moral perceptions, links itself up
more logically with the inductive, or utilitarian, theory of morals.
The notion that morals were originally based on utility and by a
successive association of ideas became metamorphosed into ideals
coalesces readily with the belief that conscience is not innate but is
subject entirely to the laws of heredity and therefore is a variable
phenomenon forming a link in a chain of causes and effects. Thus
determinism, because it views every moral and immoral act as a
perfect result of foregoing causes, of which the type of conscience
exhibited constitutes one, is the logical corollary of the utilitarian
theory.
As for the claims for truth of these two opposing theories of
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morals I believe that the theory of evolution and the researches of
modern psychology have made a damaging case against the school
of lUitler and Cudworth. Unquestionably, utility is the basis of
morals. It is requesting too much of the modern intellect to ask it
to believe that our brute ancestors of former geologic ]:)eriods pos-
sessed an innate conscience and if they did not its sudden appear-
ance in the human race defies explanation. The truth is that con-
science has been a result of ages of slow development. In no oiher
way, consistent with the known physical facts of our world, can
its presence be accounted for. In no way, save by heredity, can
the infinite variety and gradations of conscience be explained.
Thus determinism, because it is the logical outgrowth of the
theory of morals which gives the best explanation for conduct
in the kind of world which science has revealed to us, afifords
the best promise of establishing human conduct on a scientific ba-
sis. It strikes a blow immediately at the conception of equalitv im-
plicit in free will which it has been the misfortune of religion to
emphasize. Thus the sinner can save himself if he only will. Failure
to do so is due to obstinacy or indifference on his part. Left out of
consideration are such psychologically important things as heredity,
emotional stability, meagre subliminal activity. Congenital obsta-
cles in the way of reform never mitigate the censure of the religion-
ist for the unregenerate.
With such conceptions of an innate ef[uality of moral insight de-
terminism can make no compromise. It is committed to the be-
lief that all conduct, good, bad and indifferent, can be entirely ex-
plained by the antecedent conditions of which inequality of con-
science and will are themselves results of causality.
Now it is this attempt to get at the rock-bottom facts underlying
conduct, instead of assuming that man possesses an innate moral
faculty which his remote physical'ancestry refutes, that causes de-
terminism to appear so promising when it comes to placing hu-
man conduct upon a scientific basis. It declares that were the an-
tecedent causes leading up to an individual's choice completely
known, it could be predicted with as sure a certainty as the chemist
can predict results in his laboratory. All the psychological theories
as to the influence of environment and other determining factors
in normal and subnormal life are based ultimately upon this be-
lief which in turn rests upon the knowledge that nature is perfect.
290 THE OPEN COURT
For an imperfect result cannot emanate from nature. A cripple
is a perfect cripple according to time and conditions. The ante-
cedent causes in his case having been thus and thus he is the per-
fect result. So with conduct ; every act must be a perfect result of
objective and subjective causes. Here then, considered in the large,
is the justification for the sacrifice of egotism by determinism : it
affords an approach to the exceedingly difficult problem of conduct
that is based on things as they are ; not as we would like them to
be and therefore assume so. Thus, of the two theories of morals,
determinism, not free will, belongs in the promising category of an
experimental science.
As to the individual reaction to the loss of egotism the question
has to do with a morally superior and inferior viewpoint. Egotism
often plays a beneficent role in human conduct and must be given
a place by determinism in the chain of antecedent causes. Thus
the desire to be well thought of by his fellowmen impels an individ-
ual to virtuous actions. Still such an incentive, however practical
or efficacious it may be, is an egotistical one, because the individ-
ual is seeking credit for something he could not help but do. From
the deterministic view-point pride over conduct is related to con-
ceit over good looks. A large element of humanity has reached the
intellectual stage where, inasmuch as they realize that good looks
are but an accident of birth, vanity with respect to them arouses
their derision. For while good looks, rather than ugliness, is to be
desired we feel that no credit accrues to the possessor.
Such is the attitude of the deterniinist towards his own good
conduct. Like the Sufi who give all credit to the Creator for their
virtue the deterniinist attributes his moral acts altogether to im-
pelling causes. He has a high regard for good conduct and acts
in accordance with his ethical convictions but takes no more credit
for such acts in the last analysis than for good looks if he is for-
tunate enough to possess them. His compensation for the loss of
egotism is that he has reached an intellectual position where he is
beyond the egotistical need of the applause of his fellowmen. A
pure and unadulterated incentive to good conduct is the last word
in morals.
